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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cipality brought a declaratory action to have this lease declared
null and void. Three distinct grounds of invalidity were urged by
the city: (1) the lease was not advertised and adjudicated to
the highest bidder, as required by law; (2) the consideration for
the lease was not serious; and (3) the legislative act authorizing
the city to execute such a lease was unconstitutional, as violating
the constitutional prohibition" against the loan, pledge, or grant
of public property. In the trial court, exceptions of no cause of
action and estoppel filed by defendant were overruled; and
after a trial, judgment was rendered holding -the lease null
and void.
This judgment was reversed on appeal. As the statute
authorizing the lease required no advertisement and adjudica-
tion to the highest bidder, and specifically authorized the lease
to defendant, the general requirements of law were held inap-
plicable. The agreements made by the lessee to keep the build-
ings repaired and insured, and to assume responsibility for all
injuries sustained therein, were held to provide the serious con-
sideration required for the validity of the contract. The Supreme
Court held the third contention of the municipality equally with-
out merit, by pointing out that the leasing of governmental prop-
erty was not a loan, pledge, or grant within the intendment of
the constitutional prohibition.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
It has now been some seven years since the Louisiana Pub-
lic Service Commission promulgated its opinion and order fixing
a rate base and a rate of return for Louisiana Power and Light
Company:' the event was significant because it marked the
adoption of a "prudent investment-cost of capital" approach to
the determination of the rate base and the rate of return. The
opinion provided:
"The rate base to be used in determining a fair return
shall be the total original cost of the property in useful
service plus the allowable amount of utility plant acqui-
33. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 12.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 65 PUR (NS) 18 (1946).
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sition adjustments not amortized through charges to oper-
ating revenue deductions plus a reasonable allowance for
materials and supplies and for cash working capital, less the
amount of capital secured from customers as contributions
and construction advances.
"The rate of return to be allowed shall be such a per-
centage of the rate base which will yield enough money
after all reasonable operating expenses, maintenance, taxes,
annual retirement or depreciation appropriations and amor-
tization of utility plant acquisition adjustments have been
paid or set aside, to pay bond interest and sufficient stock
dividends to maintain the credit of the utility, attract new
capital, reward good management and to enable the inves-
tor to recoup at any time the money he has prudently in-
vested. The rate of return is a question to be determined
in each individual case from evidence as to efficiency of
the operation of the subject utility, market prices and ratio
of earnings to market value of the stocks and bonds of
similar enterprises operating under similar conditions, and
any other relevant facts."
2
In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Comm.,3 the Supreme Court has now given its tacit approval
to the use of the commission's "prudent investment-cost of capi-
tal" approach to rate making. Paradoxically, perhaps, at the
same time it has given an applicant utility substantially (though
not all) 4 the relief asked for.
Applicant asked for a 20 per cent increase in rates, an
increase alleged to be necessary to assure a return of 61/ per
cent on its "depreciated rate base." Commission staff calcu-
lations indicated that for the year considered the adjusted net
2. Id. at 23.
3. 222 La. 132, 62 So. 2d 250 (1952).
4. The applicant's brief contains a vigorous and well-documented attack
on the failure of the commission to give consideration to the present value
of the utility property in its rate order, quoting the court's statement in
Southern Bell Telephone Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
187 La. 137, 174 So. 180 (1937), that rates and charges which reduced the
net return to the point where they did not represent just and adequate
compensation on the present fair value of the property were illegal and
must be set aside. The attack evoked no more than a passing reference
In the court's opinion to the Hope case (Federal Power Commiss. v. Hope
Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 [1944]) and a reference to the adoption
by the commission of the "prudent investment" theory. Thus the court
accepted, apparently without question, the right of the commission to
abandon "fair value" as a criterion.
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operating income represented a return of 5.1 per cent on net
or depreciated rate base. The staff also calculated that for the
entire operations of the company net operating revenues cov-
ered interest charges and preferred dividends and left a return
of 12.4 per cent on the common stock equity. A financial and
market expert for the applicant testified that a return of 10 per
cent on the common stock equity would be necessary to attract
additional common stock capital. On the basis of these and
other considerations, the commission denied the application for
a rate increase. Applicant's suit in the district court was dis-
missed on the ground that it had failed to sustain the burden
of proof necessary to rebut the presumption that rates fixed
by the commission would yield a reasonable return to the
applicant and were not confiscatory. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the district court, annulled the order of the com-
mission, and granted the 20 per cent increase in rates requested
by the applicant.
The court summarized the commission's position in the
Louisiana Power and Light Company case as substantially "that
the rate of return to be allowed was not to be a fixed static
percentage of the plant investment but that the rate in each
individual case would be determined from evidence as to the
efficiency of the operation and other factors." Despite this com-
mission disclaimer that it was tying itself to a "fixed static"
percentage return, the court found that the commission had
allowed a rate of return of 6 per cent (or slightly more) on
invested capital in some 29 cases decided since adoption of its
"prudent investment" approach. The proposition to which this
history of commission action is deemed to lead is that "if 6%
is and has been considered by the Commission to be a just and
equitable rate of return, it would seem that refusal to grant an
applicant a rate increase which would enable it to earn 6 % would
be inequitable and unjust in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances."5 Among the "exceptional circumstances" or "other fac-
tors" in the case which impressed the commission, but failed to
impress the court, was, of course, the fact that allowance of a 6
per cent return on prudently invested capital would mean a 12.4
per cent return on the applicant's common stock equity. The
frailty in the commission's "exceptional circumstances" was that,
in calculating a return in excess of 10 per cent on the common
5. 222 La. 132, 142, 62 So. 2d 250, 253 (1952).
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stock equity, there were included earnings from an industrial
steam-electric operation over which it was found not to have
jurisdiction. Eliminating these earnings, as required by the
court's decision, left an amount for the common stock presumably
less than 10 per cent, although it is not clear that this was so from
either the commission's or the court's opinion. Had the commis-
sion demonstrated that with these earnings eliminated there
would still be in excess of 10 per cent for the common equity, the
court, I believe, would have accepted the conclusion that an
increase in rates at this time was not appropriate. In other words,
if the commission had demonstrated that the applicant, with an
overall return of less than 6 per cent, could pay bond interest
and preferred dividends and have remaining earnings repre-
senting in excess of 10 per cent on the common stock equity,
the case for an increase in rates would have rested squarely
on the sufficiency or insufficiency of that excess to attract addi-
tional needed capital at current "cost of money" rates.
In this regard, it is difficult to see how the commission can
fully utilize its "prudent investment" approach to the prob-
lems of rate-making without utilizing the corollary "cost of
capital" analysis beyond the point which it did in this case.
Thus, after noting that the return (including the industrial
steam-electric earnings) would represent 12.4 per cent on the
common stock equity, the opinion comment is that this analysis
was based on company-wide operations in Louisiana and Texas
and that "it is impossible to allocate the capital structure of
the company to any specific part of its operations. '7 It seems
apparent, however, that the analysis for the Louisiana commis-
sion and courts will be inadequate if the return on Louisiana
operations is not allocated among the respective segments of
applicant's capitalization so as to demonstrate what that return
means in earnings for an allocated "Louisiana" common stock
equity. Unless the analysis is carried this far, the commission
will always find itself in the position it is on this appeal, that
is, of being unable to demonstrate successfully that failure to
permit a 6 per cent return to an applicant is not necessarily
discriminatory even though it has allowed a 6 per cent return
6. The settlement of this dispute has important consequences in imposing
a continuing supervision of allocated facilities upon the commission. This
question and the jurisdictional question alluded to have been discussed in an
earlier issue of this REvIEw, Note, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 617 (1953).
7. Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Louisiana Public Service Com-
mission, Order No. 5931 (Feb. 15, 1952).
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to other seemingly similar applicants in the state. A demon-
stration that present rates which represent less than an overall
return of 6 per cent but nonetheless represent in excess of 10
per cent earnings" on the common stock equity allocated to
the Louisiana operations might well support refusal to permit
an increase to 6 per cent. Less than 6 per cent return overall
would then not be "inequitable and unjust" because of the pres-
ence of such "exceptional circumstances." The results of such an
analysis could quite plausibly be among the "other relevant
facts" which the commission has said it would consider in
arriving at "reasonable and just" rates.8
It is interesting to note the relatively greater interest by
utilities generally in bringing in more of their invested capital
at the common stock level of the capital structure. Given accep-
tance of the notion by regulatory bodies that common stock
money is generally entitled to earn 10 per cent or more as against
earnings of say 2% per cent to 5 per cent to be allotted to bonds
and preferred stock, it is apparent that a capital structure with
50 per cent common stock and surplus will require a higher
overall return to assure 10 per cent to common stock equity
than will a capital structure of only 25 per cent common stock
and surplus.10 The development is not without its paradoxical
8. Applicant's expert witness assumed 10% return on the common
stock equity as the current "bare bones" cost of common capital. The com-
mission has indicated that the ratio of earnings to market prices of the
stock and the ratio of earnings to market value of stocks of similar enter-
prises operating under similar conditions will be relevant facts in the
determination of the rate of return to be allowed. The cost of common stock
capital could therefore be either more or less than 10% depending on the
way in which the market appraised the applicant's risk characteristics.
9. Another criterion which the commission has indicated it would use,
namely "efficiency of operation" might perhaps better have been cast in
the opposite terms of "lack of efficiency of operation," at least where It is
to be brought into play in the consideration of an application for an increase
in rates. Thus conceivably the commission's investigations might lead it
to conclude that in a given case an application for an increase should be
refused, even though the alleged rate of return was less than 6% on pru-
dently invested capital, because the operation was being conducted with
such lack of efficiency that a portion of the revenues which should have
come through to the common stock equity was being dissipated in unneces-
sary expenses. Judgments of this kind would, of course, entail utilization
by the commission of model expense analyses compiled from industry ex-
perience against which to measure the performance of any given utility
operation. For a recent experience of the California Public Utilities Com-
mission in attempting to regulate contracts for services between a subsid-
iary operating company and its parent which were alleged to result In arbi-
trary exactions, see Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
of California, 34 Cal. 2d 822, 215 P. 2d 441 (1950).
10. In an era of less sophisticated regulation, the touchstone of a "fair
return on fair (reproduction cost new) value" made possible a more reward-
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aspects, since it sometimes places utilities commissions in the
position of having to resist the influx of too much venture capi-
tal into the industry because of its relatively greater costli-
ness,1 1 whereas such an influx, from the standpoint of financial
regulation generally, has been regarded as a healthy develop-
ment.
12
Civil Code and Related Subjects
LEASE
J. Denson Smith*
Only two cases reached the court for the adjudication of
problems involving ordinary leases. The question of whether
a verbal lease of a filling station to a lessee "as long as he wanted
it, provided he ran it right" was within the purview of Louisi-
ana Civil Code Article 2685 as one entered into "without fixing
its duration" was answered in the affirmative in Herring v.
Breedlove.' The lessee's suit for damages was dismissed. In
another case, Probst v. Nobles2 the court held that a reduction
of rent ordered by the housing expediter did not have the
effect of terminating the lease. This conclusion was supported
by the proposition that when the parties entered into the lease
contract they were chargeable with knowledge of the provisions
of the Housing and Rent Act then in force. The fixing of the
rent by the housing expediter was therefore contemplated by
them as a matter of law. The case was remanded for a deter-
mination of the question as to whether the lease contract had
been violated by sub-leasing.
ing "trading on the equity" operation. Thus, if "fair value" as determined
on a "reproduction cost new" basis was substantially in excess of total in-
vested capital, and if senior charges were at an average rate substantially
less than 6% on senior invested capital, net operating revenues representing
6% on such excessive fair value could mean returns for the common stock
equity very considerably in excess of 10% thereon. The decision in the Hope
case collapsed many such structures.
11. For a development of this problem, see New England Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 97 N.E. 2d 509 (Mass. 1951).
12. For a statement of policy on this matter by the Securities & Ex-
change Commission, see In the Matter of El Paso Electric Co., 8 S.E.C.
366, 383 (1941).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
2. 66 So. 2d 609 (La. 1953).
1. 222 La. 1088, 64 So. 2d 441 (1953).'
